The Law
Office of
David Perry Davis
31 Jefferson Plaza
Princeton, NJ 08540
(732) 274‑9444
(732) 274‑2050 (fax)
Attorney for plaintiffs
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Jeff Golden, Dorothy
Mataras, Robin K. Vinik, Dominick Romano, Dr. Dwight E. Garcia, Eric Mataras,
Gunnar Wahlstrom, as private citizens of New Jersey,
Plaintiffs
vs.
Hon. Richard Codey,
individually and as President of the New Jersey Senate,
Senator John H. Adler,
individually, and as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and as a
member of the New Jersey Senate,
Senator John A. Girgenti,
Senator Byron M. Baer, Senator Nia H. Gill, Senator William L. Gormley,
Senator Joseph M. Kyrillos, Senator Robert J. Martin, Senator Paul A. Sarlo,
Senator Nicholas P. Scutari, Senator Bob Smith, individually and as members
of the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee and
the New Jersey Senate,
Marianne Espinosa, Esq.
Defendants
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW
JERSEY
LAW DIVISION
MERCER COUNTY
DOCKET NO. MER-L-
Civil Action
MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
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David Perry Davis, Esq.
On the brief
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ii
Table of Authorities iii
Table of Contents to
Exhibits ix
Statement of facts 1
Argument
Point
I: THE COURT SHOULD ENTER A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ENJOINING DEFENDANT MARIANNE ESPINOSA FROM TAKING OFFICE AS A JUDGE
OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 5
A.
There exists a reasonable probability of eventual success on the merits
B. Irreparable injury would result if the
injunction is not granted
C. A weighing of the equities favors the
entrance of the requested preliminary injunction
Point
II: THE SENATE'S VIOLATION OF RULE
12:3(b) CONSTITUTED AN ACTIONABLE VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS' PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS 8
Point
III: THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT IS
JUSTICIABLE IN THAT PLAINTIFFS' FUNDAMENTAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE'S VIOLATION OF RULE 12:3 (b) 10
Conclusion 12
Table of Authorities
Federal Case law
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Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
675 F.2d 1282
(D.C.Cir.1982) 12
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Bi‑metallic
Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441 (1915) 8
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The Connecticut Judicial
Selection Commission v. John B. Larson, President Pro Tempore of the
Connecticut Senate,
745 F.Supp. 88
(D.Conn.1989) 8
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Connecticut Educ. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Tirozzi,
210 Conn. 286, 554 A.2d
1065 (1989) 8
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Rogin v. Bensalem Township,
616 F.2d 680, 693
(3rd Cir.1980) 9
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Pineman v. Fallon,
662 F.Supp. 1311 (D.Conn.1987), aff'd,
842 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988) 9
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Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211,
82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 682 (1962) 10
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New Jersey Case law
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Crowe v. DeGioia,
90 N.J. 126 (1982) reh'g on remand 203 N.J. Super.
22 (App. Div. 1985) 5
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DeVesa v. Dorsey,
134 N.J. 421, 429
(1993) 10, 11
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New Jersey
Senate Rules
Rules Governing the Courts
of the State of New Jersey
Table of Contents to Exhibits
Certifications by plaintiffs Exhibit
A
New Jersey Legislative
Calendar affirming date of notice for June 27, 2005 meeting of the Senate
Judiciary Committee Exhibit B
(Relevant) Rules of the New
Jersey Senate Exhibit C
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July of 1986, Marianne Espinosa Murphy was appointed as a
Judge of the Superior Court. Her
initial term expired in 1993. In every
judicial survey, including those conducted by the New Jersey Law Journal, the
Morris County Bar Association, and the Supreme Court Committee on Judicial
Performance, Judge Espinosa Murphy ranked in (at best) the lowest ten percent
in every category.
Responding to an avalanche of complaints by his constituents
concerning Judge Espinosa's demeanor, fairness, her treatment of litigants and
attorneys, her explosive temper, her lack of adherence to court rules, her lack
of knowledge as to the law, and generally substandard and unacceptable
performance, Senator John H. Dorsey exercised senatorial courtesy and refused
to approve Judge Murphy's reappointment.
Judge Murphy turned down a second untenured term offered by
then-governor Jim Florio, commenting "I'm not going to go begging for this
job." She left the bench on
September 11, 1993.
In June of 2005, Marianne Espinosa Murphy (n/k/a Marianne
Espinosa) was - incredibly - again nominated to be a judge of the Superior
Court in spite of her past performance.
In the weeks that followed, Senator John Adler, chairman of the
judiciary committee, Acting Governor Codey and all the members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee received letters from individual citizens and organizations
indicating they wished to be heard at the hearing regarding the nomination,
uniformly indicating that they vehemently opposed her return to the bench and
demanding that they be provided with as much notice as possible as to the
scheduling of the Senate Judiciary Committee meeting to consider her
nomination.
Senate Rule 12:3(b) requires that "at least five State
working days" notice be given of any Committee meeting (Exhibit C). Notice is provided to the public via the New
Jersey Legislative Calendar and is updated on the judiciary website.
In order to avoid this controversy and to ignore the will of the
people he was elected to serve, Senator Adler intentionally deprived the
citizens of New Jersey of the notice to which they are entitled by failing to
notify the public at large of the hearing.
The legislative calendars for the week preceding the meeting of
the Senate Judiciary Committee are attached as Exhibit B. There is no notice as to a hearing to
consider Marianne Espinosa's nomination.
On Saturday, June 25, 2005, a notice appeared on the judiciary
website indicating that Ms. Murphy's nomination was to be considered less than
48 hours later, on Monday morning. This
was the first public release of the date and time for the hearing. By contrast, those who wishes to testify in
favor of the nomination were provided with more than the required notice.
At the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on June 27, 2005,
defendant Marianne Espinosa's nomination was approved by a vote of 8 to 1.
On Thursday, June 30, 2005, on the motion of Defendant Senate
President Hon. Richard Codey, the full senate considered the nomination. The Senate then voted 34-2 to approve the
appointment.
Defendant Marianne Espinosa is scheduled to be sworn in on July
22 and to again become a Judge of the Superior Court.
This complaint and order to show cause followed.
This Court is not being asked to make any findings as to the
merits of defendant Espinosa's appointment, her past performance nor her
judicial abilities. The sole issue
before this Court is whether the violation of Senate Rule 12:3(b) by the New
Jersey Senate gives rise to a private cause of action by citizens and
organizations to enforce their procedural due process rights under the Federal
Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act of 2004.
If so, judicial intervention is mandated and the remedy of enjoining
Marianne Espinosa from taking the oath of office as Judge of the Superior Court
is required.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All legitimate political power derives solely from the consent
of the governed. By democratic
processes, the people entrust their lives, liberties, and possessions to the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of our government. N.J.Const.
Art. I § a.
To give effect to these core concepts and rights upon which our
democracy is based, the New Jersey Senate promulgated Rules to ensure that the
popular will is properly considered
the "consent of the governed" obtained before subjecting the public to any type of
authority, including judicial authority.
Senate Rule 12:3(b) demands that the Senate Judiciary Committee
provide "no less than five state working days notice" of a hearing to
bestow the power of a judgeship on a citizen.
In purporting to appoint defendant Marianne Espinosa to the bench
without providing the required notice to the public, the New Jersey Senate
violated its duty to the public, its own rules, and violated plaintiffs'
rights.
As explained below, this matter is a justiciable controversy
with only one just outcome: a declarative judgment that defendant Marianne
Espinosa's purported appointment to the bench was illegitimate and warrants a
permanent injunction barring her from taking office unless and until the Senate
complies with its rules and its fundamental obligation to the people and
conducts a proper hearing with proper notice.
To avoid irreparable harm to plaintiffs and the public trust, the
requested preliminary injunction should issue.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE
COURT SHOULD ENTER A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENJOINING DEFENDANT MARIANNE
ESPINOSA FROM TAKING OFFICE AS A JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
This application for emergent relief is submitted pursuant to R.
4:52-2, which provides for the application of such relief during the pendency
of an action.
The standards for the granting or withholding of emergent relief
are well established. Generally, the
moving party must demonstrate that:
A. There exists a
reasonable probability of eventual success on the merits;
B. Irreparable injury
would result if the injunction is not granted;
C. A balance of equities
in which the damage to the moving party and the absence of an injunction is
weighed against the harm to the respondent if the relief is granted. See Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J.
126 (1982) reh'g on remand 203 N.J.
Super. 22 (App. Div. 1985) citing Continental Group, Inc. v.
Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356‑57 (3d Cir. 1980)Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R.R. Co.,
29 N.J.Eq. 299, 303 (E. & A. 1878); Paternoster v. Shuster,
296 N.J.Super. 544 (App.Div. 1997).
It is respectfully submitted that when applying the above
standards to this case, the Court should grant plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction.
A. There exists a
reasonable probability of eventual success on the merits.
There can be no legitimate question as to
the salient facts: the Senate Rules
require that the public be provided with at least "five State working
days" notice as to a meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This rule was violated. The right of the public to be heard is not
only fundamental, it is the most basic underpinning of our democracy. As more fully explored below, this is a
justiciable issue warranting judicial intervention. The remedy sought is the only appropriate response to defendants'
conduct.
Plaintiffs' probability of success on the merits is sufficiently
high so as to warrant the entry of the requested injunction.
B. Irreparable injury
would result if the injunction is not granted.
To subject the people of New Jersey to illegitimate authority
would constitute a violation of the public's procedural due process
rights. To appoint defendant Marianne
Espinosa to the bench while this matter is pending, only to later have a Court
grant plaintiffs the declarative and injunctive relief they seek would
potentially result in the negating of all orders signed and decisions made
during her aborted term on the bench.
This would potentially expose the State to further litigation and, at a
minimum, would require emergent curative action from properly appointed judges.
Harm is generally considered irreparable in equity if it cannot
be redressed adequately by monetary damages.
Crowe, 90 N.J. at 133.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' case is not monetary.
C. A weighing of the
equities favors the entrance of the requested preliminary injunction.
No interest asserted by defendants can outweigh the
constitutional mandate that the people be provided with sufficient notice of a
hearing and the opportunity to be heard before they are subjected to judicial
authority.
Preliminary relief should be granted in emergent situations
requiring the preservation of the status
quo and the prevention of irreparable harm, after balancing conveniences and
the interests of the parties, until the final determination of the litigation
involved.
The
requested temporary restraining order should issue forthwith and a preliminary
injunction should be entered on the return date.
Point II
THE SENATE'S VIOLATION OF
RULE 12:3(b) CONSTITUTED AN ACTIONABLE VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS' PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
The United
States Supreme Court has held that procedural due process is implicated when,
as in the case before this Court, "the proper state machinery has
[not ] been used." Bi‑metallic Investment Company v. State
Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915). In the context of legislative action,
procedural due process is not a right to be heard by each and every individual,
but rather a right to the legislative
process. The Connecticut
Judicial Selection Commission v. John B. Larson, President Pro Tempore of the
Connecticut Senate, 745 F.Supp.
88 (D.Conn.1989), citing Connecticut
Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Tirozzi, 210 Conn. 286, 298, 554 A.2d
1065, 1071‑72 (1989). The issue
of whether every citizen has a right
to be heard by a legislative body has been repeatedly answered in the
negative. See, e.g. Bi‑metallic Investment Company v. State Board of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (It was that it was "hard to
believe that the proposition was seriously made" that all individuals have
a constitutional right to be heard before a legislative body can act).
This Court
is not being asked to invent standards that would satisfy the public's right to
a meaningful "legislative process" and procedural due process. This was done by the explicit text of the
New Jersey Senate Rules and includes the public's substantive due process right
to "at least five State working days" notice of any Committee meeting
(Exhibit C).
The Third
Circuit has explicitly affirmed that the people have a procedural due process
interest in the legislative process being adhered to. Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3rd
Cir.1980). In the matter before this
Court, the established legislative process was undeniably disregarded by
defendants.
It is not
the role of a Court to substitute its opinion on the merits of legislative
action (or Senate Rules), but only to examine the legislative action to
determine whether the established process was adhered to and, if not, whether
the violation of the process was arbitrary and irrational. Pineman v. Fallon,
662 F.Supp. 1311, 1317 (D.Conn.1987), aff'd, 842 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 48 (1988).
This Court
is not being asked to pass on whether plaintiffs' have an independent
constitutional right to be heard by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Rather, this Court is confronted with facts
that mandate only one conclusion: The
violation of Senate Rule 12:3(b) was a violation of the legislative process
itself and resulted in a violation of plaintiffs' procedural due process
rights.
Point III
THE SENATE'S VIOLATION OF
RULE 12:3(b) IS A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY MANDATING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
It is the responsibility of the Courts to decide whether a
matter has been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government
and is therefore nonjusticable. DeVesa
v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 421, 429 (1993), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct.
691, 706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 682 (1962).
In DeVesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 421 (1993), the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld a trial court denial of a challenge to the use of
Senatorial Courtesy to block Marianne Espinosa from receiving tenure. The Court was equally divided on the grounds
for affirmance.
In the concurrence filed by Justices Pollock, Clifford and Garibaldi, it was held that the challenge to
the use of Senatorial Courtesy was nonjusticable as "no standards exist by
which the judiciary can determine whether the exercise of senatorial courtesy
constitutes an abuse of that power" DeVesa, 134 N.J. at 426.
Although denying the challenge then before them, the Supreme
Court was clear that some challenges to Senate action are justiciable. The Court
affirmed that if an issue is "subject to judicial review, we may proceed
to the substance of the claim." Id.
at 429.
The situation before this Court is immediately distinguishable
from DeVesa as the written Senate Rules, by definition, provide explicit
standards. There is nothing ambiguous
about Rule 12:3(b)'s mandate that the public receive notice of a hearing with
"at least five State working days" notice and there can be no denial
that the violation of this Rule deprived the people of the right to be heard.
Under the standard set forth and reviewed in the first
concurrence in DeVesa, the issue before this court is justiciable and
should be addressed.
The holding of the second three justices (concurring in part and
dissenting in part), is even more supportive of plaintiffs' assertion that the
issue before this Court is justiciable and the requested relief mandated.
The words of the justices explicitly and unequivocally address
the issue before this Court:
Courts readily acknowledge
the breadth of legislative rulemaking governing internal legislative
procedures. Because a practice
reflects a legislative rule or procedure does not mean, however, that
application of the rule or procedure is immune from judicial review. A legislative procedural rule is subject to
judicial review if there is an obvious violation of fundamental rights. When the inquiry is whether the legislature
or any other body or officer has violated the regulations of the constitution
it is entirely plain that the decision of that subject must rest exclusively
within the judicial department of the government. DeVesa 134 N.J.
at 456-457 (internal citations omitted).
Federal Courts exploring the issue of justiciability have
reached the same conclusion through a nearly identical analysis. In Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 675 F.2d 1282, 1286‑88 (D.C.Cir.1982),
the Second Circuit held that "[J]udicial intervention may be appropriate
where rights of persons other than members of Congress are jeopardized by
Congressional failure to follow its own procedures."
In the matter before this Court, the most basic fundamental
right of people in a democracy - the right to be heard - was arrogantly
disregarded by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
This constituted a violation of the procedural due process rights of the
people the Senate were elected to serve and, specifically, of the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court should find that the issue is
justiciable in that the rights of plaintiffs in particular, and the people of
New Jersey in general, were wantonly violated by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
The preliminary injunction against defendant Marianne Espinosa
taking the oath of office should issue and plaintiffs are entitled to the
requested injunctive, declarative and monetary relief.
Respectfully submitted this
15th day of July, 2005
____________________________
David Perry Davis, Esq.
The Law Office of
David Perry Davis
31 Jefferson Plaza
Princeton, NJ 08540
(732) 274‑9444
(732) 274‑2050 (fax)
Attorney for plaintiffs
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Jeff
Golden, Dorothy Mataras, Robin K. Vinik, Dominick Romano, Dr. Dwight E.
Garcia, Eric Mataras, Gunnar Wahlstrom, as private citizens of New Jersey,
Plaintiffs
vs.
Hon.
Richard Codey, individually and as President of the New Jersey Senate,
Senator
John H. Adler, individually, and as chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and as a member of the New Jersey Senate,
Senator
John A. Girgenti, Senator Byron M. Baer, Senator Nia H. Gill, Senator William
L. Gormley, Senator Joseph M. Kyrillos, Senator Robert J. Martin, Senator
Paul A. Sarlo, Senator Nicholas P. Scutari, Senator Bob Smith, individually
and as members of the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee and
the
New Jersey Senate,
Marianne
Espinosa, Esq.
Defendants
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SUPERIOR
COURT OF NEW JERSEY
LAW
DIVISION
MERCER
COUNTY
DOCKET
NO. MER-L-
Civil Action
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATIVE
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
and
ACTION IN LIEU
OF PREROGATIVE WRIT
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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This is an action by various New Jersey citizens and
organizations asserting a claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:4‑15 and
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act of 2004, and a private cause of action arising from the
defendants' violation of the Rules of the Senate of the State of New Jersey
concerning mandatory notice to the public of any hearing on a judicial appointment.
2. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that defendant
Marianne Espinosa's alleged appointment to the bench is illegitimate and an
injunction enjoining her from her taking office unless and until such time as a
proper hearing is conducted in accordance with Senate rules.
II. JURISDICTION AND
VENUE
1. Jurisdiction is conferred
on this Court by Article 6 §1.2 of the New Jersey Constitution. This is an action arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of New Jersey. The plaintiffs cause of action arises under N.J.S.A.
10:4‑15 and as a private cause of action for the violation of Senate
Rules, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act of
2004.
2. Venue is appropriate
under Rule 4:3‑2(a) as defendants are located or reside in this judicial
district, and the alleged events giving rise to the claim occurred in this
county.
III. PARTIES
1. Plaintiffs are citizens
of New Jersey entitled to the protection of the Senate Rules. All said plaintiffs would have submitted
live or written testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee had proper
notice in accordance with the Senate Rules been provided.
2. Defendant Hon.
Richard Codey is the President of the New Jersey Senate, and as such is
responsible for ensuring that the Senate adheres to duly enacted Rules intended
to benefit the public.
3. Defendant Senator
John Adler is the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and is as such
responsible pursuant to Senate Rule 12:3(b) for calling a meeting of the Committee
for the purpose of considering nominations referred to them by the President of
the Senate.
4. Defendant Senators John A. Girgenti, Byron M. Baer, Nia H.
Gill, William L. Gormley, Joseph M. Kyrillos, Robert J. Martin, Paul A. Sarlo,
Nicholas P. Scutari, and Bob Smith, are members of the Judiciary Committee of
the New Jersey Senate and as such are bound to adhere to the Senate Rules.
5. The New Jersey Senate
is an organization established pursuant to Article IV, Section I of the New
Jersey Constitution. The Senate is
authorized pursuant to Article IV, Section IV of the New Jersey Constitution to
establish its rules, which then become binding on it.
6. Defendant Marianne
Espinosa conspired with the other named defendants to circumvent the public's
procedural due process rights under Senate Rule 12:3(b). As an attorney and former judge, she knew or
should have known that the public was entitled to notice of her appointment
hearing.
Additionally, she is a person having an interest in the controversy,
and who ought to be made a party in order that the court may do complete
justice by adjusting all the rights involved.
V. CAUSE OF ACTION
As to plaintiff private
citizens
1. Plaintiffs Jeff Golden, Dorothy Mataras, Robin K. Vinik, Dominick
Romano, Dr. Dwight E. Garcia, Eric Mataras, Gunnar Wahlstrom are citizens of
the State of New Jersey. Had they been
provided with the lawfully prescribed notice of the hearing of the judiciary
committee, they would have testified in opposition to the appointment of
defendant Marianne Espinosa.
2. Plaintiffs procedural
due process rights under the United States and New Jersey Constitution, as well
as their rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and their rights pursuant to the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act were violated by the New Jersey Senate when the
Senate purported to appoint defendant Marianne Espinosa as a judge without
having provided the public with proper notice.
As to defendant Hon. Richard
Codey
3. Hon. Richard Codey, as the President of the
New Jersey Senate, had an absolute duty to the plaintiffs to abide by the Rules
of the New Jersey Senate.
4. This duty was
violated when Senator Codey posted the nomination of defendant Marianne
Espinosa for a vote by the full Senate after the public had been deprived of
its right to be heard in a proper committee hearing.
As to Senator John H. Adler
5. Senator John Adler
was legally bound to comply with the Rules of the Senate [pursuant to typo
omitted ]
6. This duty was
violated when Senator Adler called a Judiciary Committee hearing for June 27,
2005, at 9:00 a.m. as to the appointment of Marianne Espinosa without providing
the public with "at least five State working days" notice.
7. Senator Adler
violated his duty and the public's trust by intentionally scheduling said
hearing with insufficient notice so as to avoid the participation of citizens,
including plaintiffs, who he knew to be opposed to defendant Espinosa's
appointment as a Judge of the Superior Court.
The intentional scheduling of the appointment hearing of defendant
Espinosa without due and proper notice to the public constituted a conspiracy
against the citizens of this State, including plaintiffs.
As to Defendant Senators
8. Defendant Senators
John A. Girgenti, Byron M. Baer, Nia H. Gill, William L. Gormley, Joseph M.
Kyrillos, Robert J. Martin, Paul A. Sarlo, Nicholas P. Scutari, and Bob Smith
had an absolute duty to adhere to the Senate Rules concerning notice to the
public of any hearing.
9. Defendant Senators
violated this duty by voting on the nomination of Defendant Espinosa for
appointment as a Judge of the Superior Court.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court enter a judgment in
its favor and against the defendants:
1. Declaring the purported appointment of Marianne Espinosa as a
Judge of the Superior Court to be invalid;
2. Prospectively requiring the New Jersey Senate to adhere to its
rules concerning notice and a public hearing before again considering the
nomination of Marianne Espinosa;
3. Enjoining Marianne Espinosa from being sworn in and/or taking
office as a Judge of the Superior Court;
4. For damages against Senator Adler, individually and as chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, for engaging in a knowing conspiracy against
plaintiffs;
5. For counsel fees and costs pursuant to 42 US § 1988 and pursuant
to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act of 2004;
Respectfully submitted this
15th day of July, 2005
___________________________
David Perry Davis, Esq.
The Law Office of
David Perry Davis
31 Jefferson Plaza
Princeton, NJ 08540
(732) 274‑9444
(732) 274‑2050
(fax)
Attorney for plaintiffs
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Jeff
Golden, et al
Plaintiffs
vs.
Hon.
Richard Codey, et al
Defendants
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SUPERIOR
COURT OF NEW JERSEY
LAW
DIVISION
MERCER
COUNTY
DOCKET
NO.
Civil Action
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
With temporary restraints
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THIS MATTER having been opened to the Court on application of
plaintiffs, David Perry Davis, Esq., appearing, for an order
to show cause, and notice
having been given to defendants, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,
attorney for legislative defendants, Marianne Espinosa, Esq., pro se, and the Court having read and
considered the certification and brief annexed hereto, and it appearing
therefrom that substantial and irreparable harm shall occur in the absence of
such relief and before a formal Notice of Motion can be filed and heard,
IT IS, on this day of , 2005 ,
hereby Ordered that defendants shall show cause on the
day of ,
2005 ,
at : before the Hon. , J.S.C., located at the Superior Court of New
Jersey, 175 South Broad Street, Trenton, why an Order should not be entered:
1. Declaring the appointment of Marianne Espinosa as a judge of the
superior court to be invalid and prospectively requiring the New Jersey Senate
to adhere to its rules concerning notice and a public hearing;
2. Enjoing Marianne Espinosa from being sworn in and/or taking office
as a Judge of the Superior Court;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that,
pending the resolution of the issues raised herein:
1. A preliminary injunction is hereby entered. Defendant Marianne Espinosa is hereby
enjoined from being sworn in and/or taking office as a Judge of the Superior
Court;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
That defendants may move to
modify or dissolve the within restrains on
days notice to counsel for plaintiffs.
That counsel for defendants
shall file and serve any opposing papers no later than ,
and plaintiffs' reply, if any, shall be filed and served no later than __________________ and
oral argument shall be held on _________________, at ________ a.m.
_________________________________
Hon. Linda R. Feinberg AJSC
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