UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                                  FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

 

                       :  Docket No. 01-2735

MICHAEL ANTHONY, et al.,      :

:  United States Court House

vs.               :  Independence Mall West

:  601 Market Street

GERALD COUNCIL, et al., :  Philadelphia, PA  19106

:

Appellants        :  April 24, 2002

 

 

      TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT OF APPEAL

      BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANTHONY J. SCIRICA, THE HONORABLE

      MARJORIE O. RENDELL AND THE HONORABLE JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.

 

 

APPEARANCES:  

 

For the Plaintiff Class of

Appellants:                   DAVID PERRY DAVIS, ESQ.

                                    31 Jefferson Plaza

Princeton, NJ  08540

 

For the Defendant Class of

Appellants:                   BARBARA J. STOOP, ESQ.

Deputy Attorney General

P.O. Box 112

Trenton, NJ  08625

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      Proceedings recorded by electronic sound

      recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

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THE COURT:  Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS:  Your Honor, may it please the Court, David Perry Davis on behalf of the putative plaintiff class of appellants, Michael Anthony, Anne Pasqua and all persons similarly situated.

I would like to reserve four minutes for rebuttal.

THE COURT:  Fine.

MR. DAVIS:  Judge, as the panel is aware, our federal courts have [a virtually] unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction that's given to them.  Younger provides an exception to this general rule, and it is the exception, not the rule, according to the United States Supreme Court.  However, for Younger to be implicated there must be a pending state proceeding.

I don't believe that a fair reading of the record can leave even a question as to whether there's a pending proceeding.  There's a threatened proceeding.  There is a possibility of a future proceeding, but there is no pending proceeding in these cases.

The district court rule that -- based on [UIFSA] which is an interstate child support jurisdiction statute has created somehow a contest vis-à-vis the federal state court as to who should have jurisdiction to enforce child support rules.

Initially I want to stress and keep a focus here that this is really not a child support issue.  It's an appointment of counsel issue.  The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services stated that we cannot incarcerate an indigent citizen in this country unless they are represented by counsel at the hearing.

The state that we're arguing this in today, Pennsylvania, will appoint counsel.  Every other state and territory within the Third Circuit appoints counsel in child support matters.  New Jersey does not.

When I say Lassiter is unanimous, I mean it was unanimous as to the point.  The more liberal members of the court had argued that the standard for appointing counsel should be lower, that any consequence of magnitude or potential consequence of magnitude should trigger the right to counsel being appointed for indigent litigants.

However, everyone was for it, it was unanimous that if you're facing incarceration you should have counsel.

THE COURT:  Let's assume -- let's assume we agree with you.  The question is what court should this be litigated in?

MR. DAVIS:  Judge, Section 1983 provides a presumption of the federal forum for a federal civil rights -- I would also ask the court to notice that subsequent to the filing, my adversary had sent a case to the court and that it be considered, and I had joined in that request.  And I had submitted a transcript from a state level civil report, Leonard v. Blackburn.  In that case the Superior Court of New Jersey, the Assignment Judge of Mercer County ruled that she did not have jurisdiction to entertain a class action against her fellow sitting judges in the Superior Court.

The decision that was submitted by my adversary, and I also submitted a copy, and I understand how correct -- incorrectly it was submitted directly to Your Honors, and I'm sorry about that.  In state court it's common practice when oral argument is on the horizon.

In that case the Appellate Division of the State of New Jersey has directly contradicted the mandate of the Supreme Court in Lassiter and indicated that these indigent litigants who are facing incarceration can be compelled to attend hearings where they face the loss of liberty without having counsel.

New Jersey is, to the best of my research, one of three states in the entire country that continues to do this, continues to cause people that are in arrears in child support to be subjected to incarceration without having counsel appointed.

THE COURT:  Why should you not go up to the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Appellate Division --

MR. DAVIS:  I agree that that may be an option.  I also believe that under Section 1983 the federal court is also an option, and I -- again, the case law is clear that the federal forum is available for the vindication of federal rights.

THE COURT:  Well, is this an odd -- you know, if we look at the factors for abstention, particularly whether this is an ongoing proceeding or not, can a good argument be made that in these kinds of support proceedings that they are ongoing?  Not perhaps for some of the reasons that the district judge gave, but because the nature of it.  I mean, sometimes they're initiated in other states.  Even if they're initiated within the State of New Jersey they continue until -- they continue to the age of majority for the young person or can include college education as well.  They're subject to many modifications, changed circumstances.  There's -- you know, there's one file.  The file stays open.  At least -- I'm not familiar with New Jersey, but I was a state court judge in Pennsylvania, and I know that there's one file and it continues, and it gets changed a lot.  Why is it that different from the ordinary kind of civil case?

MR. DAVIS:  I would say that that would be to extend Younger, Judge, because there has to be a pending proceeding.  Yes, the Superior Court retains jurisdiction, but again, I -- we're now focusing on child support and we're now focusing on family law.  These should not be the focus of this courtroom -- issue of appointment of counsel when incarceration is at issue.  It's not a child support issue.

The Supreme Court has said when a -- does not seek in any way divorce or alimony.  We could add child support into there.  It is not -- it does not fall within the domestic relations exception.  I'm not sure that Your Honor is exactly arguing with the domestic relations exception.

THE COURT:  I'm not.  I'm purposely staying away from it.

MR. DAVIS:  I would stand firmly on -- it would be incorrect to focus on whether or not this is a family court issue, a child support issue, an alimony issue.  It's an incarceration issue. 

And the United States Supreme Court has issued a unanimous mandate that it was going on -- what's going on today, right now, in New Jersey cannot happen constitutionally in this country. 

There was an article that I had enclosed from a newspaper that indicated that the AOC, the Administrative Office of the Courts in New Jersey states that there's over 50,000 enforcement hearings going on every year in the State of New Jersey.

THE COURT:  But don't you, in fact, argue the point that Judge Scirica is making, and that is that your clients are very likely to be hauled back into this system again so that they face that threat, if you will, which means that it is an ongoing -- an ongoing situation.  I assume you're trying to get yourself into the most prospective relief category. But by doing so aren't you also nullifying or annulling existing state court system which seems to be what the -- what the pending action element is aimed at?

MR. DAVIS:  It causes the appellants to walk something of a fine line --

THE COURT:  Right.

MR. DAVIS:  -- because under Lyons we must allege that there's a probability of a recurrence.

 

THE COURT:  Right.

MR. DAVIS:  And --

THE COURT:  And by doing so --

MR. DAVIS:  -- it turns it into a Catch-22, because if we don't allege the possibility of probability of a recurrence, then we can't get an injunction.  And if we do allege it, then there's an ongoing system. 

The Court has been explicit that it's not the existence of a system, it's a pending proceeding.  I proposed a very simple test that you should ask as to the plaintiffs.  When is the next court date as to these --

In this case the answer to that question is never, potentially never.

THE COURT:  Well, it's -- it all depends on whether there's a changed circumstance or whether the defendant doesn't pay his monthly payment or -- then he's back into court the next month. 

There's not a fixed date certainly, but it could happen at any particular time.

MR. DAVIS:  It could happen and from the record in this case it's clear that in one of these cases the arrears had developed over a period of a couple of years.

THE COURT:  What would be your strongest case assuming there is jurisdiction and there's no certainty that they will be -- come up again in New Jersey?

MR. DAVIS:  I would say, Judge Noonan, that there's several of the cases that are cited, and they're -- transcripts, so the arrears had gone on for a long time.

THE COURT:  No, but what Supreme Court case would say we have jurisdiction in this -- in these circumstances?

MR. DAVIS:  Section 1983 is where I would begin --

THE COURT:  No, I would think we'd need a case saying that under these circumstances there's an actual controversy.

MR. DAVIS:  I actually set out in my brief to the District Court about a page and a half of citations where Federal District Courts and Federal District Courts of Appeal have addressed this issue.

THE COURT:  Well, how about a Third Circuit or Supreme Court case?

MR. DAVIS:  Supreme Court case I would have to say Lassiter is most on point if we focus on the issue of incarceration without counsel.

THE COURT:  Well, that's the merits issue.  We're talking about saying that -- a real proceeding has to be actually pending.  In fact, the District Court relied on the Utigy (phonetic) case, which didn't say that, which said opportunity to raise the constitutional claims in the procee -- in the system is sufficient for us to examine comity so I think what Judge Noonan's getting at is a lot of the Supreme Court cases seem to not be drawing the line that you're drawing.

MR. DAVIS:  Before we even get into the issue of comity, I think we have to have a pending proceeding, and I think when there's no pending proceeding, when there is no scheduled court date as to the plaintiffs, we shouldn't even move on.  It sounds like Your Honor is moving to the second set of --

THE COURT:  Well, that -- but no, before we get to Younger the question is do we have jurisdiction?  Is there an actual controversy?  And when there's no pending proceeding what Supreme Court case tell us we have an actual controversy?

MR. DAVIS:  Again, it comes to the fine line of having to allege this under Lyons out of alleged probability of future proceedings versus an actual pending proceeding.

I would argue that anybody that's under arrears is subject to at any time receiving notice from Probation saying, "You must -- hearing," whereas you may not -- as the judges -- "Bring your toothbrush."  That could happen at any time if someone is in arrears on a child support obligation.

THE COURT:  Well, I say under some order to keep up payments they're not going to go back and get the whole amount.  They just have to keep up with whatever they're being ordered to pay; isn't that right?

MR. DAVIS:  In many of these cases there's a legitimate question of the ability of the payer to keep up.

THE COURT:  Well, that's -- that's one of those contingencies of what's out there.  We don't know whether A, B or C is going to keep up the order.  It's not an actual or even pending threat.

MR. DAVIS:  I would -- I would submit that the record as it was submitted for District Court even on the preliminary -- as a preliminary state is such that we can determine that there's a probability of a future occurrence, 'cause -- procedure.

THE COURT:  And how would we go about fulfilling the probability?

MR. DAVIS:  The fact that they're under arrears.  There was a court rule cited in 535, I believe it is, in my reply brief that sets out that at any time that someone's in arrears they may receive a notice from probation.

THE COURT:  But once they -- once they come in.  They owe $100,000, and they're ordered to pay 100 a week or something.  Now, presumably that order was set with some attention to what they're earning.

MR. DAVIS:  Counsel reported -- Your Honor's referring to the one person who actually did have $100,000 in arrears, he was the father of four children by three different mothers, and he, as a non-attorney, didn't know that he could have --

There's no way -- he never earned enough to keep up with all three orders.  If counsel had been appointed I believe there either would have been malpractice or there would have been an appropriate application.

THE COURT:  Well, that may -- I mean, I don't think anybody questions the need for counsel.  The question is whether we've got a current controversy.  And the question is how do we know if somebody is going to be called back in?

MR. DAVIS:  Again, it's a fine line between Lyons and there being a lack of a controversy.  They're all in arrears, and therefore, they all remain subject to --

THE COURT:  But it isn't the fact that they're being in arrears that would produce this.  They're back in court is they're failing to pay a current order; isn't that right?

MR. DAVIS:  Perhaps their inability to pay.

THE COURT:  So then we -- what we really have to know is are they unable to pay the current court order.

MR. DAVIS:  I would think that that's a factual determination that would have to be made in each case.

THE COURT:  Well, I should think so, before you had a controversy.

MR. DAVIS:  I would submit that the record has been submitted in the District Court and the transcripts that are there indicate that these issues have been discussed -- most of the cases that come up.

THE COURT:  Is there any reason to believe that this cannot be properly litigated in the state court system?

MR. DAVIS:  Yes, the two opinions that were submitted, one by my adversary and one by myself, indicate first of all that the Superior Court of New Jersey has held that it cannot entertain class action against its own judges.  And secondly, the -- opinion which was the New Jersey Appellate Division, which indicates that -- which ignores Lassiter.

THE COURT:  Well, it may be wrong, but it's capable of being litigated through the system, and it can go to the New Jersey Supreme Court, and it can go to the United States Supreme Court from there.

MR. DAVIS:  I would also submit that this is an issue, obviously, of constitutional magnitude.  It goes to the most fundamental constitutional rights that our citizens enjoy.  Despite the fact that possibly go through another appellate case and application for -- and then perhaps back to the District Court.  It's already been a year and a half since this case -- it was two years, I believe, since this case was filed.  This is an issue that's -- of some importance, and it does implicate the constitution in a way that there should be some kind of emergent --

THE COURT:  The New Jersey Supreme Court is a certiorari court?

MR. DAVIS:  Yes, I believe so.  It's a certification.

THE COURT:  Certification.

THE COURT:  They haven't been asked to take this issue?

MR. DAVIS:  To the best of my knowledge, no.

THE COURT:  'Cause it seems like maybe that's at least a step.

MR. DAVIS:  I've never disputed that this issue -- well, up until Leonard v. Blackburn (phonetic) and Judge Feinberg holding that she can't entertain a class action against other Superior Court judges, I have never disputed that it could also be brought in state court.  But the 1983 -- also federal court.

THE COURT:  Well, you know what made it class action, if you've got the Supreme Court of New Jersey saying the rules are invalid.

THE COURT:  Well, that's true.  There's also, I would say, the possibility at least that counsel would be compensated with a class action, and I think that's -- public policy -- when the -- in a section 1983.  If you bring this as a civil rights action and prevail, that counsel be compensated.  If you bring it as a habeas corpus or just a -- through the system, it's a lot of work.

THE COURT:  No compensation, yeah.

MR. DAVIS:  -- no chance.

THE COURT:  Mr. Davis, thank you very much.

MR. DAVIS:  Thank you.

THE COURT:  We'll have you back.

Ms. Stoop?

MS. STOOP:  Good morning, Your Honors.  I am Barbara Stoop.  I am a Deputy Attorney General with the Division of Law of the State of New Jersey, and I'm here representing the four appellees.

The appellant tries very hard to convince the Court that there is no pending proceeding, pending state proceeding.  However, upon a reading of Huffman v. Pursue Limited it's clear that there is a pending proceeding in this case. 

As the Court --

THE COURT:  That would -- excuse me.  That would satisfy the federal jurisdiction; is that correct?

MS. STOOP:  I think --

THE COURT:  Are you conceding that there's federal jurisdiction here?

MS. STOOP:  I am -- I am conceding that there is possibly federal jurisdiction here; however, this is an issue that should be --

THE COURT:  Abstained.

MS. STOOP:  -- abstained. 

THE COURT:  All right.

MS. STOOP:  And should be brought in the state court.  This is an issue of tantamount import to the State of New Jersey.  It's dealing with how they conduct their child support and their child support enforcement hearings.

I believe that the District Court properly recognized that the child support area is a unique area of the law, and it has laws unto itself, unlike any other area.

One of those laws is the ability of a person, a child support obligor, to appeal at any time, come to the court at any time with any child support issues and bring them before the state court, the -- at the trial level, at the appellate level and finally to the Supreme Court.

The issue -- the case is open.  Any time a child support enforcement is brought in any of the -- these appellants' cases, it is brought under the Family Court matter.

These cases are considered open as far child support issues are concerned.  And these courts provide an adequate opportunity for these appellants to bring these issues, these constitutional issues, and I believe that what the Supreme Court was trying to say in Huffman was that when you initiate a case or you have a case initiated in the state, finish it in the state.  Don't come to the federal court until you've finished it in the state.  Once you've finished it in the state and you receive no satisfaction there, then bring it to us.

Younger --

THE COURT:  Well, are you saying there has -- there's a form of exhaustion that they have to go through?  I didn't think that that was required.

MS. STOOP:  I believe, Your Honor, that the cases that were referred to by my adversary as not requiring exhaustion of state remedies were referring to cases where there was not a case already initiated in the state. 

I -- my reading of those was that you don't have to exhaust state remedies, meaning you don't have to have a case in the state first.  You can come right to us with 1983 cases.  But Huffman says if you already have something started in the state, then you need to finish it in the state.  After you've finished it in the state and exhausted your state remedies, your state appellate remedies there, then come to us.

THE COURT:  What about the -- this decision that says that the New Jersey courts won't entertain class actions against other New Jersey judges?

MS. STOOP:  Your Honor, the case that Mr. Davis was referring to was Leonard v. Blackburn, which he and I had in the state court.  The issue of representation was not addressed in that matter.  Mr. Davis had brought a case having to do with ability-to-pay hearings in New Jersey.

We -- the issue of representation was not addressed in that case.  What the judge had indicated in that case was that Mr. Davis was requesting that she, as a trial level judge, rule on whether or not other trial level judges were, in fact, conducting ability-to-pay hearings that were sufficient to satisfy state policy.  And as a trial level judge, the trial judge said she was not -- she did not have the authority to make that kind of a ruling, and she advised Mr. Davis that that issue should be taken before the New Jersey Appellate Division.

THE COURT:  Well, has the issue before us been litigated in a trial court and then gone to an appellate court?

MS. STOOP:  Yes, it has, Your Honor.  It was, as cited by Mr. Davis, the case of Scalchi v. Scalchi.  And in that -- in that decision the Appellate Division indicated that because the New Jersey Supreme Court had not yet acted upon this, and because at this point there was no direction that people, such as appellants, should be represented or have appointed counsel, that they could not reverse the trial court's decision.

However, I believe that this case also issues an open invitation to someone to bring this to the New Jersey Supreme Court and let them deal with it.  The Appellate Division basically didn't say there's absolutely on way that New Jersey is ever going to appoint counsel in these types of cases, but merely indicated that it was awaiting direction from the New Jersey Supreme Court.

THE COURT:  Mr. Davis says that we are -- we're missing the point here if we look at this as a domestic relations issue.  This is simply a right to counsel issue and fits neatly under 1983 and ought to be in federal court.

MS. STOOP:  I'm afraid I disagree.  Although it does have implications of constitutional questions, there is also the right or the need for New Jersey to be able to enforce their child support and the need for them to develop their system for enforcing child support.

I think it's also important for this court to understand that Mr. Davis makes it sound like everyone who comes before the Family Court ends up in jail.  And I want to make it very clear that New Jersey state policy is that no indigent, no indigent will be imprisoned or incarcerated.  The state policy is that there must be an ability-to-pay hearing before any child support obligor is incarcerated.

So, if you look at it that way, under Lassiter, these appellants would not really be entitled to appointment of counsel, because there's no way if they are indeed indigent that they face a risk of loss of liberty.

THE COURT:  Well, I think that -- you know, I think that depends on which side you're standing.

MS. STOOP:  Obviously.

THE COURT:  You're right.  If you're a litigant you would prefer to have a lawyer in most cases to help you convince the factfinder that you don't have the ability to pay.

MS. STOOP:  But there are -- there are ways of getting an attorney, Your Honor, other than having them appointed.

Mr. Davis works with indigent -- indigent clients.  There are other people in New Jersey who work with indigent clients.  There's also a lawyer service.  And, in fact, on the notice that's sent out -- on the notice that is sent out there is a phone number listed.  "If you cannot afford an attorney and you want one, call this number."

And people can call and take advantage of that.  It's not -- it's not like they cannot have an attorney there.

THE COURT:  That is, they are pro bono lawyers that --

MS. STOOP:  I beg your pardon?

THE COURT:  The number that is cited, is that for pro bono lawyers or --

MS. STOOP:  That is for Lawyer Services.

THE COURT:  Lawyer Services, which is volunteer on the part of the organized part?

MS. STOOP:  Correct.

THE COURT:  Okay.

MS. STOOP:  Correct. 

THE COURT:  Has an appeal been filed in Scalchi?

MS. STOOP:  I do not know, Your Honor. It was --

THE COURT:  Just earlier this month.

MS. STOOP:  Yes.  It was just recently released, and I am not aware whether an appeal was --

THE COURT:  Let me ask you this.  It may be that it would be better for the New Jersey Supreme Court to make this decision, but why is a federal court prohibited from making this decision?  Why is abstention required in a situation like this?

MS. STOOP:  I think for several of the reasons that we've already discussed, as well as the fact that there is -- my understanding of the reasons for Younger is to make sure that there is an opportunity to be heard.  And there's no reason for the federal court to intervene in a matter where there is an opportunity for the appellant --

THE COURT:  Well, we have -- we're -- you know, we have concurrent jurisdiction in many areas.  We have dual court systems, and sometimes people can face us in state court and sometimes in federal court.  And it's appropriate in many cases to make that election.

MS. STOOP:  But this is something that is very important to the State of New Jersey.  This is something that is integral to their judicial system.  And the federal court, under comity, has many times abstained from hearing something that affects the state's judicial processes.  And this is one of those  -- this is one of those issues.  This is the state's judicial process that Mr. Davis is asking this panel to deal with or to rule on.  This is something that the State of New Jersey should deal with and rule on.

THE COURT:  Seeing the operation of the state courts and our third circuit, one would have thought that the New Jersey Supreme Court would have been the first of the supreme courts to provide for this legal representation.  And I was a bit surprised to find out it was not.

MS. STOOP:  I'm not sure the issue has ever been put before it, Your Honor.  I'm sure that if it had been put before it, it would have ruled.  But if -- they can only rule on what's brought before them.  And as I indicated before, there is -- there is not a denial of the right to representation in child support hearings.

The notice specifically indicates that if you would like to have an attorney present you may bring one.  If you cannot afford an attorney you may call this number and, you know, and see if you quality for an attorney from Lawyer Services.

So, I don't know why it's never come up before.  Perhaps because no one has ever had this problem before.  Also, they all have the right to appeal pro se if they wish.  And several of them do appeal pro se.

THE COURT:  Any other questions? 

Okay, thank you very much, Ms. Stoop.

MS. STOOP:  Thank you.

THE COURT:  Mr. Davis?

MR. DAVIS:  Initially I had indicated -- I made a passing reference to my reply brief on the issue that seemed to be the center of the question.  Page 7 of the reply brief quotes the New Jersey Court Rule, "If a person fails to make payments, the Probation Division responsible to monitor and enforce the compliance may re -- shall notify such person by mail that such failure may result in the institution of contempt proceedings.  The Court may then, in its discretion, institute contempt proceedings, and the aggrieved party may apply for relief."  That is the process under which a contempt hearing is scheduled by the Court.  Any person in arrears is subject to this rule at any time.  They may -- "may" being the key word -- be brought into court and subjected to incarceration. 

They are not now facing these hearings, thus giving a Younger no applicability here; however, they may at any time, according to this rule, be brought into court, thus satisfying the test --

To very briefly respond, my understanding of Younger is that it's with respect -- it's the concepts of federalism and it's to minimize the interference with ongoing state proceedings by the federal court when there is something going on in the state court.  Originally criminal and then it was expanded -- extended to civil and administrative proceedings.

When we had a situation where, as the rule that I just cited, it's a may situation, there's on strong enough statement to convince the District Court correctly that Section 1983 should not apply.

THE COURT:  There is an active case considering this very issue on its way up in the New Jersey court system.

MR. DAVIS:  I believe -- I'm certain that the time for certiorari -- to apply for certiorari has expired in that case, in Scalchi.

THE COURT:  But don't we look as whether there's an opp -- do we look at an opportunity for appeal?  Don't we -- well, don't we see that at least there was that opportunity and it was forgone.

MR. DAVIS:  I never disputed that this could have been filed in the state court.  Realistically, let's say that this court holds the abstention.  We go back, refile in the state court.  It's in Mercer County.  That's the appropriate venue, because that's where the defendants are located.  It would go back before Judge Feinberg, the Assignment Judge of Mercer who just two months ago, three months ago, ruled that she cannot entertain a class action against other sitting Superior Court judges.

THE COURT:  Well, but I'm looking at Scalchi.  That's a different issue from what was before her.

MR. DAVIS:  Again, if there was a litigant out there who was simultaneously indigent and able to fund an appeal under the United States -- of the New Jersey Supreme Court --

THE COURT:  Getting back to fees again, huh?

MR. DAVIS:  It could go to that.  It could go that way, yes, but it has not gone that way, and Section 1983 doesn't contain a requirement that if you can litigate this in state court, do it there.  It says that if you have a valid federal claim you may file it in federal court.

THE COURT:  Yes.

MR. DAVIS:  If I may just very briefly respond to a couple of the other comments that my adversary -- Leonard v. Blackburn was about whether the ability-to-pay hearings were adequate that were being held, whether or not there was an inquiry.  There were several transcripts closed in there actually in with the submission to this court as well, where the state could would say, "You owe $10,000 in arrears.  Do you have 5,000?"  The person says, "Judge, I've never seen $5,000."  And they'll say, "Well, you'll go to jail until you see it."

And that is a shortening of it, but it really is an extension of what goes on in the state court proceedings.  And it's -- again, the transcripts, there are actual -- this Court can take judicial notice of -- were included to the district court.

Yes, there's a public policy, a need for New Jersey to enforce its child support orders; however, that ignores that every state that does appoint counsel, including Pennsylvania, Delaware, every other state that I know of that does it, doesn't have a lower child support collection rate.  Some of them have higher child support collection percentages than New Jersey.  The appointment of counsel doesn't mean that child support's not going to be, in the real world, not collected.

I think all of us as former practicing attorneys and the experience with the system knows that when the litigant hears from their own attorney -- they're going to have to pay --

THE COURT:  We'd rather hear from -- deal with the lawyer than with the pro se litigant.

MR. DAVIS:  Pro se's, as my adversary indicated, can appeal, but generally -- there were some emergent appeals that were brought.  There were manifest errors according to New Jersey Appellate Division.  Every single person was let out.  Legal Services, by its charter, does not handle defendants in child support actions.  I can tell you that as well, the Court having spoken to them.  The case Huffman as cited by my adversary was in 1975; all of the civil rights I cited were subsequent to that on Page 15 of my brief.

Does the Court have any further questions or  --

THE COURT:  Good.  Well done by both sides.

MR. DAVIS:  Thank you, all.

THE COURT:  Take the case under advisement.

 (Recording ends)

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      C E R T I F I C A T I O N

I, Betsy Wolfe, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

 

______________________________      ____________________________

Betsy Wolfe                         Date

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC.